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CHAPTER 6: WORKING WITH PRIVATE PARTNERS 
 
Batley, R and Larbi, G., ‘Working with Private Partners’, in The Changing Role of Government: The 
reform of public services in developing countries, 2004, Palgrave Macmillan (reproduced with 
permission of Palgrave Macmillan). 
 
This extract is taken from the author's original manuscript and has not been edited. The definitive version of this piece 
may be found in The Changing Role of Government by Richard Batley and George A. Larbi, which can be purchased from 
www.palgrave.com. 
 
The case for privatizing management 
 
The previous two chapters described reforms within public management. In some 
respects these have 'imported' market approaches and values into the public 
sector. In this chapter we examine the experience of 'exporting' functions to the 
private sector, and the impact this has on the functioning of public administration. 
Whether through the import of practices or the export of functions, these can be 
seen as different ways of addressing the principal-agent problem of public 
administration. That there is such a problem will be accepted for the purposes of 
this chapter, although it can well be counter-argued that this critique of public 
administration is less a description of reality and more a mobilizing device to 
generate impetus for reform (Salamon 2002, Joshi and Moore 2002).  
 
Lane (2000) represents the principal-agent problem and alternative routes to its 
reform on two dimensions as in Table 6.1. In the classical form of public 
administration, politicians are at the hub of two relationships. First, they receive 
the demands of citizens (their electorate) and, second, they fund bureaucracies 
through taxation to supply the response. Principal-agent problems arise in both 
relationships: citizens have weak control over politicians, and politicians have 
weak control over lengthy bureaucratic hierarchies. The public bureau (the 
supposed 'agent') may exercise power over the public and the politicians whom it 
should serve, based on its compulsory funding (taxation), its monopoly status, 
and the long-term contractual security of permanent employment. By contrast, it 
is argued that a firm is truly an agent because, in a competitive market, it is 
governed by shareholders' search for profit and by consumers' choice and 
willingness to pay.  
 
Some of the management reforms described in Chapter 4 and 5 involved a shift 
from type I to type II in Table 6.1. In those cases, the public service remains the 
direct provider, paid for out of taxation, but, in the shift to type II, managers are 
made accountable for their performance within shorter-term contractual 
agreements instead of having long-term employment contracts within the public 
service.  
 
The approaches described in this chapter add the second dimension of reform 
identified by Lane. They seek to change also the tax-versus-charges axis, 
towards types III and IV. They put the provider onto a more wholly marketized 
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footing, with short-term contracts and payment for services rendered. However, 
this may stop short of full privatization: government may retain ownership of 
assets, the service may be charged to clients or government may itself finance 
private providers out of taxation. The important point is that accountability of 
providers to government or to citizens is made more direct; the World Bank 
(2004) describes this as strengthening shorter routes of accountability. 
Table 6.1: From bureaucratic administration to charging, short-term 
contracts and the market 
 
 
 
Contracting 
on the 
demand side 
 Contracting on the supply side 
 Long term Short term 
Taxes I Bureau II Internal markets, 
agencies 
Charges III Concessions, 
vouchers 
IV Firm 
 
Source: Based on Lane (2000, p. 193) 
 
The cases of private participation referred to in this and the following chapters 
range from the complete privatization of the ownership of assets, through the 
contracting or licensing by government of private operators, to the private 
financing of public services by investors. The term 'private participation' is used 
because in almost all cases there is a mixture of public and private roles. Usually, 
the private partner assumes the function of directly providing or producing the 
service while government keeps overall indirect responsibility for ensuring that 
the service is delivered adequately. Indirect roles include tasks such as analyzing 
policy options, setting standards and monitoring their enforcement, raising and 
allocating finance, managing budgets, contracting, regulating and creating 
incentives for private producers (see Chapter 1). Under these forms of provision, 
government retains responsibility for the protection of the public interest while 
service managers are freed from the constraints of public administration and 
exposed to the competitive pressures of the market. 
 
The goal orientation of public leaders, in principle, is to the satisfaction of the 
'public interest', that is to the wider social interest rather than to private ends. 
Interpretations of what is in the public interest arise from a complex amalgam of 
institutionalized practices and political competing demands. Public management 
therefore involves a balancing of multiple objectives, including changing (and 
perhaps conflicting) policy goals, efficiency and equity in delivery, due process 
and legality in procedures of operation. Procedures are supposed to be open, 
transparent and subject to scrutiny. They have therefore to be based on 
institutionalized rules that govern ways of operating both internally in the 
management of staff and other agencies, and externally in relation to the public.  
Public organizations are also rule-based in relation to each other; they are 
supposed to coordinate under the authority of government, respecting each 
other's spheres of responsibility (Lane 2000 Chapter 7, Du Gay 2000). 
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While these features of public administration are necessary to the core policy-
making functions of government, they are widely thought not to be appropriate to 
the management of service delivery. They give no encouragement to operational 
flexibility, few or no incentives for the achievement of results and efficient use of 
resources, and rarely any clear basis of accountability for performance. They are 
also held to divert resources towards people with influence and away from the 
poor (Devarajan and Reinikka 2002, World Bank 1997 and 2004). One response 
has been to clarify the roles of public service managers by giving them more 
defined responsibilities, within semi-autonomous units but still within the public 
sector. Such reforms were analyzed in the previous chapters.  
 
Marketizing the delivery of public services is seen by its advocates as further 
freeing managers from the encumbrance of public service conditions (World 
Bank 1997, p.87). Within the framework of commercial contracts, goals and 
objectives can be specified, and managers freed to act flexibly and 
entrepreneurially to achieve given ends, focusing on the satisfaction of 
consumers rather than obedience to rules of procedure. Principal-agent relations 
are clarified through more direct and specific contractual relations between 
government (as principal) and independent operators (as agents).  
 
This does not remove the case for public administration but shifts it back from 
service delivery to the management of other deliverers: the public interest, policy 
objectives, transparency and coordination are now to be achieved by contract, 
monitoring and regulation.  
 
"After a decade where there has been a focus on ways of reducing the 
role of government in the economy, there is now recognition that a smaller 
role for government in the direct provision of services may mean a bigger 
role for government in policy development, co-ordination and regulation." 
(Bennett and Mills 1998). 
 
Ideally, public-private relationships combine the virtues of both public 
administration and of private management. But, this can only be true if the public 
and private partners have the capacity to perform their new roles. The danger is 
that the efficiency gains from contracting the private or voluntary sectors may be 
outweighed by the additional transaction costs of doing business between 
multiple actors. Setting policy frameworks, coordinating, contracting and 
monitoring come at a price. If the price is higher than the gain, then there is a 
better case for the full integration of the service within either the public or private 
sectors.  
 
This and the following chapters examine how far such models of public service 
reform are being applied in developing countries, whether their application differs 
between sectors, what roles are implied for government, and how far they are 
constrained by the capacity of governments and their private partners. 
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Organizational arrangements for service provision 
 
Privatization in the sense of complete divestiture has applied mainly not to public 
services but to the 'productive' and competitive activities that were previously 
organized as state-owned enterprises. State ownership of commerce, industry, 
agricultural production and marketing was common but has been internationally 
largely undone, often under pressure of structural adjustment (see Chapter 3). 
However, even in these productive sectors, the dismantling of state ownership 
has often been accompanied by the emergence of new roles for the state in 
advising, promoting, enabling or regulating the non-government sector. The 
grounds for government's continued involvement is that there is a residual public 
interest whether in developing market providers or in restraining the impact of the 
market. Some examples will be examined in Chapter 8.  
 
From the beginning of the 1990s, a further wave of reform began to affect 
developing countries - for the transfer of the delivery of social and infrastructural 
services to the private and community or NGO sectors (Odle 1993, Adam et al 
1993, Cook and Kirkpatrick 1995, Batley 1996). The first candidates included 
services such as street cleaning, waste collection, road maintenance, parks, 
hospital cleaning, catering, security guards, and public utilities such as water and 
power supply, airports and ports. Later candidates for liberalizing reform were the 
social services, particularly health and education. These were often difficult 
cases to undertake since they frequently confronted political and ideological 
objections as well as being technically difficult to put out to contract or to 
regulate. They often affected basic human needs or strategic national resources, 
involved large groups of public sector workers, were key spheres of political 
influence, and were undoubted areas of 'market failure' that required some level 
of state intervention (see Chapter 1, Box 1.1).  
 
Apart from a few countries such as the UK and Chile, the complete privatization 
of social and infrastructural services is rare. Much more common is some sort of 
contractual relationship where government retains ownership and control, while 
the private or NGO sectors take on operational roles subject to public control. 
Under these arrangements, private firms or NGOs are invited to tender for a 
contract or licence let by a government organization. The contract or licence may 
be small-scale and short-term for a specific activity financed by government, or 
large-scale and long-term where the contractor finances and manages an entire 
government function (such as the delivery of water supplies). 
 
Recognition that there is not a straight and simple choice between public and 
private provision opens up the possibility of combining the two sectors in various 
organizational arrangements. These can be seen as alternative ways of allocating 
the risks and responsibilities of ownership, financing, operation and maintenance 
between government and private or community operators (World Bank 1994 and 
1997, Savas 1987 and 2000).  
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Table 6.2 shows how ownership and the financing and operating functions may be 
split between public and private or non-governmental sectors, and gives examples 
drawn from the research1.  The cells in light gray indicate the functions performed 
by the public sector; the more heavily shaded cells identify those functions where 
there are shared public and private responsibilities; and the white cells those where 
the private sector, NGOs or users take on roles. Under different organizational 
arrangements for service delivery, government and the private sector2
 
 retain 
different degrees of responsibility for the ownership of assets, for financing 
investment and operations and for managing operations. 
The main possible organizational arrangements for service delivery are described 
more fully in Box 6.1. On a scale of declining government control, they range from 
the pure public management of services, through various levels of contracting of 
functions to the private sector, through the licensing and regulation of private 
activity, to informal arrangements of joint venture and collaboration. With regard to 
the state's role across this range of possible arrangements, there are four main 
ways in which it may be involved: 
 
1. The state directly provides services, owning, operating and financing operations 
without private involvement 
2. The state purchases the services of contractors 
3. The state licenses and regulates private, NGO or community providers 
4. The state collaborates with private, NGO or community providers through 
formal or informal joint arrangements. 
 
This and the next two chapters are concerned primarily with 2 and 3, where 
government seeks to exercise its responsibility indirectly but retaining authority. 
This chapter sets out the case for the alternative arrangements, considering how 
the nature of services and the capacity of actors may influence choice between 
them. The following two chapters look at the experience of contracting and 
regulating non-government service providers in the four research sectors.  
                                                          
1 See Batley 1996, Nickson and Franceys 2003, Plummer 2002, World Bank 1994 and 1997 for fuller 
explanation. 
2 'Private sector' is here taken to include NGO and user or community provision. 
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Box 6.1 Public-private organizational arrangements  
Pure public service delivery 
- Government owns, finances and directly delivers services. Particular one-off works or 
supplies may be purchased from contractors. 
Public ownership and finance with limited private operation 
- Government retains ownership of and responsibility for service provision but finances 
private providers to give particular support services through management or service 
contracts.  
Public ownership, some private finance and private operation 
Under these arrangements, government passes responsibility to the private sector for the 
production and delivery of the service and has ultimate ownership of the assets, with the 
following differences 
- Lease: the contractor finances the operation of the service from revenue, whilst 
government covers investment costs 
- Concession: the contractor finances the operation of the service and investment costs 
from revenue 
- Build-operate-transfer: the contractor finances the operation of the service and 
investment costs from revenue, and retains ownership until the end of the contract. 
Private ownership, financing and operation under government regulation or support 
- Provision and financing of a monopoly service by private owner/operators under 
licence, with regulation by government, 
- Competition between government-licensed private producers or deliverers of the 
service, 
- Government financial support of private consumption and provision, through, for 
example, subsidies, vouchers or loans. 
Co-production 
- Joint venture: Formal partnership between independent public and private providers 
through joint ownership, joint ventures and investment, 
- Informal understanding between organized groups of citizens/clients and state agencies 
to make resource contributions to the joint production of a service. 
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Table 6.2 Distribution of Functions in Different Organizational Arrangements 
 
Contract type 
(typical 
duration) 
Asset 
ownership 
Capital 
financing 
(investment) 
Current 
financing 
(operations) 
Tariff 
collection 
System 
operation 
Types of activity Example from 
case studies 
Works/supplies 
contract 
(one-off) 
Public Public Public Public Public with 
private inputs 
One-off -e.g. 
building or supplies 
Drug supply 
Service contract 
(< 3 years) 
 
Public Public Public Public Private for 
specific 
services 
Specific technical 
task  
Hospital 
cleaning, 
water billing 
Management 
contract 
(3-5 years) 
 
Public Public  Public Public or 
private 
Private Management tasks 
over a short period  
Water 
company 
management 
Lease contract 
(affermage) 
(10-12 years) 
 
Public Public Private from 
revenue 
Private Private Extended operation 
and maintenance 
contract 
Water supply 
Build-operate-
transfer (BOT) 
(20-30 years) 
 
Private to 
public 
Private debt 
repaid by 
revenue 
Private from 
revenue 
Private Private Major investment 
projects 
Grain mill 
Concession 
(20-30 years) 
Public Private debt 
repaid by 
revenue 
Private from 
revenue 
Private Private As lease, with 
responsibility for 
investment 
Water supply, 
Food storage 
Joint venture 
(indefinite)  
Public and 
private 
Public and/or 
private 
Public and/or 
private 
Public and/or 
private 
Public and/or 
private 
Infrastructure and 
development 
Business and 
agricultural 
services 
Co-production Public and 
users 
Public and/or 
users 
Public and/or 
users 
Public and/or 
users 
Public and/or 
users 
Local infrastructure 
and development 
 
Licensed NGO 
or charity 
NGO/charity NGO/charity, 
maybe with 
public subsidy 
NGO/charity, 
maybe with 
public subsidy 
NGO/charity NGO/charity Under contract or 
licence, especially 
in social service 
Mission 
hospitals 
Licensed private 
firm 
Private Private Private, maybe 
with public 
subsidy 
Private Private Private operation of 
services, under 
licence  
Medical 
practitioners 
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The application of public-private arrangements for service delivery 
Before looking at real cases of contracting in the next chapter, this section indicates 
how and why, in principle, alternative organizational arrangements may be 
appropriate to different public services. It adopts an essentially technical approach, 
suggesting a correspondence between the characteristics of services and how they 
might be organized. It focuses on four broad categories of organizational 
arrangement - contracting out, lease and concession, licence, and joint venture or 
partnership. 
Contracting out 
Within the framework of public ownership, there is the contracting of services paid 
for by the public sector. This may be through one-off contracts, or fixed period 
service or management contracts. Being relatively short-term and specific, they 
safeguard the interest of the public authority, which retains its control over the 
delivery of the service. These arrangements are therefore likely to be appropriate 
where there is a strong public interest and government does not wish to cede its 
responsibility because it has little confidence in its ability to handle long-term 
contracts. This may apply, for example, in situations of monopoly, or where there 
are strong equity considerations, or where there are important effects not only on 
direct consumers but also on wider society (see Box 1, Chapter 1). On the other 
hand, piecemeal contracts may have the disadvantage of creating problems of 
fragmentation and difficulties of coordination. These arrangements are therefore 
most easily manageable where tasks are naturally divisible and discrete: for 
example, construction and maintenance works, neighbourhood services, refuse 
collection, ancillary services in the health sector, and aspects of internal 
administration such as billing, salary payments and vehicle maintenance. 
 
Lease and concession of monopolies 
 
Lease and concession contracts are longer-term arrangements that allocate 
managerial and financial responsibility to the private sector. In leases, the 
contractor covers running costs from revenue; in concessions, it must also finance 
investment in fixed plant. They are ways of managing natural monopolies whilst 
avoiding the concentration of power in either the public or private sectors. They 
achieve this end by separating the direct and indirect aspects of provision, 
subjecting the private producer to public contractual control. They are most clearly 
applicable to non-public goods with a monopoly tendency and where there is 
sufficient public interest (on grounds of welfare or external effects) to justify 
continued public ownership. Examples are the public utilities (water, electricity, gas) 
and collective services such as refuse incineration, bus terminals and municipal 
market management. 
 
Build-operate-transfer schemes can be seen as a variation of lease and 
concession contracts, where the primary purpose is to achieve the construction of a 
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particular capital investment project, rather than to manage the system. The 
investor designs, finances and builds an asset - for example, a highway or a water 
production and transmission system. The investor then operates the asset for 
typically 25-30 years, in return for payments made by government, or sometimes 
by the users; after that period the asset is transferred to the government body.   
 
Licensed competition between producers 
 
Licensed or regulated competition between producers is technically appropriate to 
`private goods', that is those which it is possible to charge for and which individuals 
compete to consume. The argument for public intervention is not so strong as to 
demand direct public sector entry into the production or delivery of the service. In 
the absence of monopoly, the case for government intervention might rest either on 
the need to promote equitable access or to mitigate the effects of unrestrained 
competition on society at large. An example of the first sort would be the 
management of bus transport to ensure that an entire city is covered at similar 
tariffs; of the second that market stall-holders fulfil basic health requirements or that 
builders comply with building regulations.  
 
There are many cases where government licenses private providers but also keeps 
a stake as a direct provider itself. This applies particularly in the case of `merit 
goods', where there is a policy commitment to equitable access and government 
seeks to guarantee this by itself offering the service. Basic education and health 
are common cases of this sort. In other services, raising less profound equity 
issues, governments sometimes use licensing as a step towards reducing their 
direct role in service delivery.  
 
Joint venture or partnership 
 
Several sorts of joint arrangement can be identified where state agencies and 
private bodies act in a mutual endeavour, with or without joint ownership. Public-
private partnership in joint ownership or investment schemes is most likely to occur 
where there is a strong possibility that opportunities for private investors will be 
generated by government involvement. The public sector's contribution might be 
either to undertake necessary investments which private firms are unable to 
perform (due to their large scale, high risk, or difficulty of charging to consumers) or 
to facilitate private action (by covering risk or using the coercive powers of the 
state). Typical circumstances would be the acquisition of land and the installation of 
infrastructure for social housing and commercial development. 
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Joint venture companies are at the formal end of the spectrum. Government enters 
into contractual relationships with the private sector both in setting up the company 
and in awarding the joint company the contract to undertake the work. Unlike pure 
contracting out or concession arrangements, there is the complication that 
government participates on both sides of the contract, leading to possible conflicts 
of interest: government is there to ensure the public interest but also has an interest 
in the contracting companies' gains.  
 
Apart from the collaboration of public and private sector investors, another 
possibility is that the beneficiaries of public services may participate in their 
production and delivery.  Again the possibilities of user participation range from the 
more formal and contractual to the more informal and casual. Cooperatives 
formalize the ownership by the beneficiaries of the organization that supplies the 
service, as in the case of the water systems in Santa Cruz, Bolivia (Nickson and 
Vargas 2002). More common are looser arrangements where users collectively 
contribute to the management of a service in some form of institutionalized 
agreement that is not legally binding or formalized. The term 'co-production' has 
been coined to define these looser arrangements where the lines between state 
agencies and non-state actors are blurred (Ostrom 1997, Joshi and Moore 2003). 
 
Matching organizational arrangements to capacity  
 
There are risks and costs to be set against the possible advantages of public-
private partnerships. Successful contracting depends upon there being genuine 
competition between competent firms, social control to guard against nepotism, 
and governmental capacity to specify and enforce contracts. Where the 
conditions exist, contractual arrangements may make for efficiency; but the 
conditions are exacting. Weak public administrations may lack the capacity to 
undertake the new (indirect) roles which follow from contractual arrangements: 
setting broad frameworks of policy, managing contracts, regulating providers, 
financing and supporting providers and consumers. If they fail to do so, particularly 
in the case of monopoly services, the situation may be worse than under direct 
public provision. The transaction costs of making and monitoring contracts may 
not be justified by the possible efficiency gains in service provision. 
 
Factors to consider in assessing governmental capacity to manage contractual 
relations with private partners can be summarized as 
- The characteristics of the service 
- The complexity of alternative contractual relationships 
- The capacity of government and the contractors to manage the 
relationship 
- The institutional environment. 
 
These factors inter-relate as Chapter 7 will show. Different types of service are 
more or less suited to alternative contractual arrangements that require different 
degrees of capacity on the part of government and contractors. Moreover, 
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capacities have to be deployed within an institutional environment that may 
either support or limit the conditions for effective public-private working. 
Institutional factors include the stability of the economy and the political system, 
the functioning of the judicial and financial systems, and the relationships 
between government and the business sector. As the World Bank (1994 and 
1997) implicitly suggests, there is an uncomfortable conundrum: precisely in 
those countries where the public provision of services has failed, the conditions 
for effective private participation are likely also to be absent. The Bank's answer 
is to select for private involvement first those services that present least problem 
for contracting whilst also building government's capacity to manage more 
complex cases (World Bank 1997, p.97). 
 
The effect of service characteristics on the ease of contracting 
 
Chapter 3 described some of the characteristics of service sectors and how 
these may affect the balance of power between principals and agents, or, in this 
case, governments and contractors. Among these, Williamson (1987) has 
described three factors that determine the ease of contracting: 
• The degree to which the service can be specified in advance: Is it possible to 
adequately specify the requirements to which the contractor is subject? This 
is more difficult in the case of services where the objectives are multiple, 
long-term, non-measurable or qualitative - for example social or health 
services. 
• The degree of asset specificity: Are the assets (equipment, knowledge) 
required by the contractor so specific to the contract that choice is limited and 
the winning contractor can hold government to ransom? Large scale 
infrastructure investments (for example in the water sector) or highly 
professional or technological services in the health sector present this sort of 
problem. 
• The practicality of gathering and measuring information about performance: 
Is the contractor's performance measurable? Does government have the 
capacity to gather the information that it needs in order to monitor contract 
compliance? Information asymmetry in favour of the private provider may 
lead to 'regulatory capture', where the provider effectively controls the public 
regulator. Information gathering and assessment may be a general problem 
for a weakly organized government but is particularly likely to arise in the 
case of social (including health) and professional advisory services where 
goals are difficult to quantify and measure. 
 
The greater the difficulty of specifying and measuring performance, the more the 
principal will have difficulty in controlling the agent according to simple 
contractual rules. The argument then grows for a relationship between principal 
and agent that is more based on understanding than on specified contractual 
commitments. On the other hand, if the contract becomes too loose, it will reduce 
the pressures on the contracting agent to act efficiently.  
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The effect of contract types 
 
Different types of contract present different sorts of cost or capacity constraint. In 
principle, the risks to the contracting body and the contractor rise with the 
growing duration and complexity of contracts (Williamson 1975). Short-term, 
simple contracts where the object of exchange is discrete, present relatively low 
risk to the principal (the contracting agency) and to the agent (the contractor) 
who can more easily agree about the terms and outputs they expect, without 
concern that conditions and requirements may change over time. Short-term, 
service or management contracts for specific inputs are more likely to be 
specifiable and measurable. On the other hand, they present an opposite 
problem: a total service would have to be composed of many sub-contracts to 
specialist companies. This presents problems of high transaction costs in 
designing contracts, and coordinating and monitoring contractors. 
 
Longer term and more complex arrangements, such as concessions, have the 
advantage of wrapping all aspects of the service into one contract over a long 
period, potentially cutting transaction costs. On the other hand, the design of 
such contracts requires a great deal of information and experience to anticipate 
the relationships between all the elements of the service and to try to anticipate 
all the possible risks and uncertainties that may occur during the term of the 
contract. Since no written agreement can foresee everything that may happen 
over a 20-30 year period, long-term contracts are likely to be 'relational' - based 
on sufficient mutual trust and understanding to allow for adjustment to 
circumstances (Walsh 1995, p.136). Sako (1992) describes these as 'obligational 
contractual relationships' by comparison with the 'adversarial contractual 
relationships' that try to specify all possible eventualities in legal terms on the 
assumption that the partners seek to outwit each other (Flynn 1997). Trust may 
be injected into a contractual relationship by resorting to a third party, an 
independent regulator, in whom the partners both have confidence. In such a 
mediated relationship, the regulator should fairly recognize both the goals of the 
contracting body and the requirements of the contractor to remain viable.  
 
Particularly in the context of developing countries, all these issues are in 
question: the existence of trust between partners, the ability to handle complex 
contract design and management, and the conditions for disinterested regulation.  
 
The capacity of partners 
 
Apart from the characteristics of the service and the complexity of different 
contract types, there is also the capacity of the partners to manage contractual 
relationships between public and private partners. On the side of the private 
contractors the following questions arise:  
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- Are there alternative possible providers with adequate capacity to 
undertake service provision? Are there enough possible contractors to 
provoke competition? Can contracts be specified (broken down) in such a 
way as to maximize opportunities for small and large contractors to 
compete? 
On the side of government: 
- Does it have the skills and organization to make and monitor contracts? 
- Are the necessary instruments for contract enforcement available, for 
example by legal compliance or by the threat of affecting contractors' 
reputation by divulging information on their performance? Can 
government exercise them? 
 
Where contracting is undertaken in the absence of the necessary conditions, the 
danger and likelihood is the emergence of inefficient and even corrupt 
relationships. Two studies of contracting out in Kumasi and Accra in Ghana 
illustrate the problem, in what might be thought to be the simplest of services - 
public toilet management. Even in these very small-value contracts and even 
where the conditions exist for competition, political practices have encouraged a 
lack of transparency in contract allocation and refusal by contractors to pay 
revenues to the municipality (King, Inkoom and Abrampah 2000, Crook 2002). 
Chapter 7 will explore this question further. 
 
Experience of private sector involvement in the case countries 
 
So far, this chapter has assumed a rational planning model in which decisions 
about alternative organizational arrangements are made on the basis of service 
characteristics and the capacities of governments and contractors. This was a 
way of describing the alternatives and of identifying the factors that allow them to 
function. However, as Chapter 3 showed, history, institutions and vested 
interests are more important than rational planning in explaining reforms, 
particularly in the conditions of developing countries. As a prelude to the 
following chapters, which look at specific experiences of contracting and 
regulating, this section outlines the broad patterns of liberalizing reform and 
private sector involvement that have taken place in the research countries. The 
countries include Ghana, Zimbabwe, India, Sri Lanka and several 'reference 
countries' in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and the focus is the four service 
sectors that were studied.  
 
Business support 
The fullest government withdrawal from direct provision is in the industrial sector, 
achieved through a combination of divestiture, privatization and closure of 
unprofitable state enterprises. The textiles and garments industries were selected 
for study because, in most countries, they were among the first to develop under 
state protection and the first to be 'de-statized'. Governments have now almost 
wholly shifted from the role of direct production of yarns, fabrics and garments 
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and very largely also from regulatory and licensing roles. From state production 
and control of the private sector, governments have shifted towards attempting to 
deliver support services to the private sector - engendering a favourable policy 
framework, market analysis and promotion.  
 
Having dismantled its own import licensing function, the Ghanaian Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce has tried to adjust to giving technical advice to firms it 
had previously regulated. In Zimbabwe, the Ministry of Finance together with 
donors opted to create a semi-autonomous Zimbabwe Investment Centre out of 
parts of ministries. Completely autonomous support organizations (for export 
promotion and information support) were set up with their own or donor funding 
in Ghana and Zimbabwe. In India, among a vast number of trade-related and 
semi-autonomous industrial research and training institutions, some gained a 
new lease of life as the government released its controlling grip. From the end of 
the 1970s, Sri Lanka created a series of agencies to promote inward investment, 
developing a significant and internationally linked textile sector almost from 
nothing. The research examined the operation of these agencies intended to 
promote and facilitate private firms in the four countries - these are described in 
Chapter 8.  
 
Agricultural marketing 
The policy goal in most countries is to liberalize agricultural trade and promote a 
market economy. Progress has been relatively fast in external trade under 
pressure of international competition - for example, in meat and cotton marketing 
in Zimbabwe and cocoa purchase and export in Ghana. However, domestic trade 
in staple grains has often remained protected and controlled by governments, 
particularly in India and Sri Lanka. The growth of private trading and private 
services to farmers has often occurred, not as a result of policy, but as the 
private sector fills gaps left by the failure of government schemes. Government 
bodies have tended to cede ground to the private sector through their decline 
rather than by the planned restructuring of public intervention.  
 
Apart from the unplanned growth of private services, two types of relationship 
with the private sector were found. First, particularly in the export trade, 
governments have sought to strengthen their support roles to traders and 
farmers, for example by regulating the quality of cocoa exports in Ghana. 
Second, they have contracted the private sector to provide specific inputs to 
government-managed services, for example grain storage in Sri Lanka and India, 
maize exporting and transportation in Kenya. Government bodies have frequently 
tried to hold on to their support roles in agricultural marketing, contracting inputs 
from the private sector, rather than putting entire services out to the market.  
 
Urban water supply 
Internationally, urban drinking water is a case of radical reform. Private firms are 
increasingly being brought into the financing, construction and operation of water 
systems through short and long-term contracts. However, reform in the four core 
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countries was more limited, with the partial exception of Ghana where there were 
proposals for establishing lease arrangements for urban water supply. In India, 
Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe, reform mainly involved the changes within the public 
sector that were examined in Chapters 4 and 5: increasing the autonomy of state 
agencies, decentralizing water supply to local government, strengthening 
management, operating on a commercial basis and establishing new approaches 
to regulation. The pressure on state-owned utilities to operate more efficiently 
had led some to contract out specific functions to the private sector - for example, 
meter-reading, billing and managing pumping stations.  
 
The water sector offers a range of types of contract - service and management 
contracts, lease, concession, and build-operate-transfer - that will be analysed in 
Chapter 7. But, the research had to go beyond the four core countries to examine 
the more radical cases of privatized management, in Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago. The major research question 
is whether such reforms can operate in poorer countries. 
 
Health care 
The broad structure of curative health services as between the public and private 
sectors remains largely unchanged by reform in the four core countries. The 
private sector is dominant in primary and informal care and is, at best, weakly 
regulated, while the public sector is dominant in hospital and formal provision. 
The main reforms again largely focus on re-structuring within the public sector - 
decentralization from and reorganization of ministries of health - rather than in 
changing its role. With regard to private providers, policy statements declare the 
intention to improve regulatory frameworks, to support private sector 
development and to contract out services but are weakly implemented in most 
cases.  
 
On paper, there has been more radical reform in the African than in the Asian 
cases with proposals for the contracting out of support and clinical services. 
Subsidies to non-profit (church) hospitals were also common in Africa. However, 
in practice, the Asian countries, including Thailand, presented more examples of 
successful contracting out. These appeared to be less rooted in (donor-led) 
ideology and more in pragmatic decisions than in the African countries. 
Contracting is much more often of support services than of the clinical aspects of 
health as Chapter 7 will show. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Public administered services face two principal-agent problems: citizens have 
weak control over policy-makers, and policy-makers have weak control over 
lengthy bureaucratic hierarchies. Theory suggests that introducing the private 
sector into the delivery of public services can help to overcome these problems. 
This may be by full privatization, or government may retain ownership of assets, 
and itself contract and finance private providers out of taxation. By putting the 
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provider (the agent) onto a marketized footing, under contract and with payment 
for services rendered, the citizen and policy-maker (the principals) are given 
more control over the performance of agents. Within the framework of a contract, 
goals and objectives can be specified, and managers are freed to act flexibly and 
entrepreneurially to achieve given ends. 
 
Full privatization, in the sense of complete divestiture, has applied mainly in the 
productive sectors - industry, agriculture and commerce. The complete 
privatization of social and infrastructural services is rare. Much more common is 
some sort of contractual relationship where government retains ownership and 
control, while private firms or non-governmental organizations deliver all or part 
of the service. Under different contractual arrangements, government and the 
private sector retain different degrees of responsibility for the ownership of assets, 
for financing investment and operations and for managing operations.  
 
There are technical grounds why different arrangements may be suitable to the 
provision of different services:- contracting out where tasks are naturally divisible 
and discrete; lease and concession where services have a monopolistic tendency; 
licensing where government needs to promote equitable access or to mitigate the 
effects of unrestrained competition; and joint ventures where there are 
complementary interests between the public and private sectors.  
 
However, the judgement about whether and how to contract depends also on the 
capacity of government and private partners to handle alternative contractual 
relationships. Services where it is difficult to specify the desired outputs (for 
example, because they are qualitative) and to gather information to measure their 
effects are intrinsically the more difficult to contract. Short-term contracts may be 
easier to agree and to monitor and less risky than long-term concessions but, on 
the other hand, they may impose higher management costs on government. 
Governments may or may not have the skills and organizational capacity to design 
and implement contracts, and the private sector to compete for them. The capacity 
of the partners will in its turn be influenced by the context in which they operate - for 
example, the degree of political and economic stability and respect for the rule of 
law. 
 
The real decisions of government to engage in one or the other form of 
partnership with private firms depend on the history and institutions of particular 
countries and of particular service sectors within countries. This chapter has 
described the broad pattern of liberalization in the research countries. The 
industrial sector and external agricultural trade are generally the most fully 
liberalized, while formal urban water supply and health care remain more 
resistant to change. However, in all cases there is a tendency to move towards a 
stronger involvement of private service providers. Chapter 7 goes on to examine 
the experience of contracting out services to the private sector, while Chapter 8 
examines how governments regulate and enable private providers.  
